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   In this paper , I analyzes the game behaviors between supervisor and manager . 
Taking apart the relation between supervisor and manager clearly and finding ways to 
improve the efficiency of securities regulation.I found that it is not effective to 
improve the regulation efficiency if we hardly punish supervisor who is not studious 
and dutiful, which can cause collusive behavior between supervisor and manager in 
some conditions. Using game theory, this paper researched renting and collusive 
issues in securities markets ,and I draw a few useful conclusions : if variable subjects 
to uniform, any bribor can not increase his bribe and work even if other bribors 
become more and more; in some situation, I gave an accurate formula, with which we 
can figure out the number of  exterior auditors that listed company needs. In the last , 
I used true people to do five experiments on renting and collusive issue in laboratory, 
and experimental conclusions are exciting and useful，which match experimental 
mechanism design very well. 
   The using new approaches in composing dissertation involve game theory , 
principal-agent theory and experimental economics . The studying innovation is : 1) 
Analytic approaches are new and frontier . Using game theory , I constructed some 
game analytic models of securities regulation behaviors , which can clearly and 
wholly post game behaviors , renting or collusive issues between supervisory and 
manager . At laboratory , using experimental economics approach , we did five 
controlled experiments on subjects , and observed their renting and collusive 
behaviors ,which are very hard to be observed in real life . With controlling 
parameters ,I can find which factors are important to renting and collusive issues .2) 
The studying conclusions are useful . According to these conclusions , we may both 
directly guild mechanism design of proofing securities regulation , and may directly 
have reference effect for other industries .3) In laboratory experiments with true men , 
we can find clearly that renting or supervisory collusion behaviors related with 
established each other trust and reciprocity during mostly repeated game . Many 
reasons caused collusion come into being : regulation institute is unreasonable , 
intensity of regulation is not enough , discipline is executed rarely , and so on . 
 By the situation of securities market and regulation institute , legislature should 













administrators can work routinely and punish irregularity , and put an end to kinds of 
contraband . Administrative departments should consummate executive codes , cut 
down expenditure of regulation , hold back kinds of illegal behaviors timely and 
effectively ; securities guild should make more function ; economists should supervise 
securities market with news and media groups , which makes fee mostly sleazy . 
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2001 年 6 月 14 日上证指数达到迄今为止的历史 高值 2245 点之后，中国
证券市场进入长达四年之久的熊市。2005 年 3 月 30 日上证综合指数更是跌破












是我国证券市场的特殊性使然。我国上证综合指数可以在 1992 年 5 月 21－26 日
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